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It has been imagined by many, that the distinction between Law and
Equity is necessary or essential; or, on the other hand, that every system
of positive law is distinguished or distinguishable into Law and Equity. But,
in truth, the distinction is merely historical and confined to the particular
systems of some societies. . . . So far is the distinction from being universal
and necessary, that I believe it is nearly confined to the Roman and English
Law. .... 1
It was, then, only an historical phenomenon of our Anglo-American law
that the needed amelioration and improvement of the administration of
law by the existing courts, through an application of the principles of
equity, should have been entrusted to a new and independent court-the
court of chancery. It is only natural that the development of the powers
of this new tribunal, claiming independence and authority to operate upon
men's consciences, should have been opposed and obstructed by the courts
of law whose judgments and judge-made law the chancery court was
attempting to correct. The latter was thrown upon the defensive and it
was only natural that conflicts between law and equity should have arisen
and that there should have been differences between law and equity as
administered by the separate courts.
But today, where the two courts have been merged into one and where
that one administers both law and equity, there are no longer two contest-
ants to continue to wage that combat of our historical past. With reason,
therefore, one may inquire why when hostilities have ended, any of the
confficts and distinctions between law and equity should be permitted to
survive. But there are still some survivals of the old distinctions and the
reason for this is that though there is today but one court, that court sits
alternately as a court of law or a court of equity, following the historical
pattern, depending upon whether the relief requested is of the traditional
* See Contributor's Section, Masthead, p. 436, for biographical data.
1 2 Austin, Jurisprudence, Lecture XXXVI, p. 86 (4th Ed. 1873).
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legal or equitable character. One would think that it would not be so
difficult to become freed from traditional habits and precedents that were
applicable in the long period of contest between the independent courts.
One would suppose that as a result of training and experience in practice
under the merged system and as a judge sitting on a law case one day and
on an equity case the next day, the modem judge would be tempted, as
far as it is within his powers, to disregard the distinctions and limitations
which developed during and because of the separateness of law and
equity.
No one is unmindful of the influence which equity decisions had upon
the law as decided by the courts of law long before the merger statutes
were enacted. As only one example, we can recall the attitude of Lord
Chief Justice Wilmot in Collins v. Blantern.2 The suit was upon a bond.
The plea was that the bond was founded upon an illegal consideration,
namely, a promise to stifle a prosecution for perjury. In overruling the
demurrer to the plea, the Lord Chief Justice said:
Equity has "a jurisdiction which never would have swelled to that enor-
mous bulk we now see, if the judges of the courts of common law had been
anciently as liberal as they have been in later times .... I have always
thought that formerly there was too confined a way of thinking in the
Judges of the common law courts, and that courts of equity have risen by
the Judges not applying the principles of the common law, but being too
narrowly governed by cases and maxims, which have too much prevented
the public from having the benefit of the common law. . . . I am not for
stirring a single pebble of the common law, and without altering the least
tittle thereof, I think it [the plea] is competent. .. ."
No one is unmindful either of the gains resulting from the statutory
merger of law and equity: creating one court with jurisdiction in law and
equity; declaring that there is only one form of civil action and abolishing
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity; and permitting,
in that one form of action, equitable defenses and replications. However,
the abolition of the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
was not an abolition of all the distinctions between law and equity. The
statute was not a mandate to the court that, when sitting as a law court,
it should adopt the attitude and standards which it would employ when
sitting as an equity court. Nor did the statute suggest that after this
consolidation of jurisdiction in both law and equity in one court, that the
court should be relentlessly restrictive in granting equitable relief and
could not be generous in expanding it where possible, in taking for
example, a liberal attitude toward the conception of "the inadequacy of
the legal remedy." The discussion which follows will be concerned with
these two points.
2 2 Wils. 341, 350-51, 95 Eng. Rep. 847, 852-53 (K.B. 1767).
[Vol. 41
A PLEA FOR EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
I. To what extent can and should the court, sitting as a court of law,
adopt the same principles and attitude that have been and will be
characteristic of it when sitting as an equity court?
II. To what extent can and should the court, when sitting in equity,
be more liberal in the granting of equitable remedies?
I
Laches as a Defense at Law
To quote Lord Chief Justice Wilmot again, one of the reasons for equity
was that the judges of the common law courts were "too narrowly gov-
erned by cases and maxims, which have too much prevented the public
from having the benefit of the common law." Equity sought to produce a
more particularized justice, to relieve a party to litigation from hardship
or prejudice that could result from a strict application of legal precedents,
rules, or procedure. It upheld and applied ethical standards. It would not
let an adversary take an unconscionable advantage of an equitable remedy
or of a legal right, remedy, or defense. To this end, it established the
power to exercise its discretion both in granting and denying equitable
relief.
Thus, we have the practice of enjoining or ordering a restoration of
equitable waste-waste for which the defendant was not punishable at
law. Thus, we have the doctrines of laches and of clean hands, because
it is unethical to seek relief when one's own delay in bringing suit has
prejudiced the adversary or because it is unethical to enforce a claim
arising out of or connected with one's own unethical conduct. On the
other hand, ethical reasons were found for denying the defendant the
advantage of a legal defense. For example, a defendant may not take
advantage of the Statute of Frauds where he has done or permitted
certain acts of part performance of an oral contract, or he may not take
advantage of the plaintiff's default on the date set for performance when
it is found that "time was not of the essence" and substantial performance
can be assured by an appropriate adjustment of interest and rents. When
a modern court sitting in equity applies these measures of fairness and
justice, is there good reason why that same court sitting at law should
not have the same power of discretion and follow the same ethical stan-
dards? There are some instances of this attitude and some methods of
giving it effect.
It has been said that:
... while statutes of limitations were formerly regarded with little favor and
courts devised numerous theories and expedients for their evasion, latterly
they are considered as beneficial, as resting upon sound public policy, and as
not to be evaded except by methods provided therein. . . .The exceptions
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contained in statutes of limitations are strictly construed and are not
enlarged by the courts upon considerations of apparent hardship.3
It is in line with this view and also in perpetuation of the separateness
of law and equity that we find it stated that "laches and acquiescence as a
bar to an action through lapse of time are only applicable to equitable
rights, and, as to legal rights, mere lapse of time before an action to
enforce them is barred, is of no moment." 4 Even when there is a statute
fixing the time within which an equity suit may be brought, a court sitting
in equity has never concluded that a delay short of that period and
amqunting to laches could not be a bar to the suit. The doctrine of laches
amoynts to this-that from a moral standpoint, the plaintiff whose delay
has A'rejudiced the defendant should not be permitted to recover. Should
not ehical standards characterize the administration of legal as well as
equitable remedies?
Happily, there are courts which have answered this question in the
affirmative and they have found methods and reasoning to give effect to
this view. The doctrine of estoppel is of equitable origin and yet it has
been taken over by courts of law. There is a kinship between estoppel and
laches. A delay sufficient to constitute laches might well be sufficient to
form the basis of an estoppel. In a North Carolina case, even though the
legal limitation had not run, it was held that the plaintiff was estopped
from suing because of his acceptance of partial benefits under a disability
policy, his continuance of premium payments and his delay.3 A United
States circuit court, reversing a district court which had held that laches
was not available in an action at law, said both that the plaintiff's delay
estopped him from suing and that laches was available as a defense within
the meaning of section 274b of the Judicial Code permitting equitable
defenses.0 The Code was again used in the third circuit to permit laches
to be used as an equitable defense.7
3 Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 746, 190 S.W.2d 994, 996 (1945). Here, plaintiff had
been committed to an institution for the insane. After establishing her sanity and securing
a release from the institution, she sued defendant for malpractice for falsely certifying her as
insane. It was held that she was not entitled to a tolling of the two year limitation for the
disability of insanity because she had not been insane.
4 1 Wood, Limitations 287 (4th ed. 1916) and cases cited therein.
5 McLawhorn v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 709, 182 S.E. 139 (1935).
Disapproved in Brenner v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 146 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1955).
6 Ford v. Huff, 296 Fed. 652 (5th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 602 (1924). See 25
Colum. L. Rev. 337 (1925), as to the meaning of an "equitable defense," whether it is
limited to instances in which equity might have enjoined a suit at law or includes what
would have been a defense in equity if plaintiff had sought equitable relief for a claimed legal
right.
7 Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1934), affirming 3 F. Supp. 737 (D.C.
Pa. 1933), noted 18 Minn. L. Rev. 82 (1933).
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Estoppel Against Pleading Statute of Limitations
As it may be unethical for a plaintiff to sue after a delay that has
prejudiced the defendant, so it may be unethical for a defendant to defeat
an honorable obligation by pleading that the statute of limitations has run.
It is difficult to understand why, when formerly courts regarded statutes
of limitations with little favor and devised numerous theories and expe-
dients for evading them, courts of the present day should construe them
strictly and regard themselves as powerless to make exceptions that would
prevent hardship." Lord Sumner reviewed the decisions of three centuries
as to the effect to be given an acknowledgment or promise to pay as
estopping the defendant from pleading the statute and characterized these
decisions as "directed to what is after all the task of decorously dis-
regarding an Act of Parliament," and he concluded that "the decisions on
the exact meaning and effect of the precise words, employed by genera-
tions of shifty debtors are, it is agreed on all hands, irreconcilable.' 9 If,
by such an acknowledgment or promise, an obligor induces his obligee to
delay suit, surely it is unethical for him then to plead that the statute has
run. But it may also be unfair to the obligor to have the making of such
an acknowledgment or promise established only by the oral testimony of
the obligee. For this reason Lord Tenterden's Act was passed as a sort of
Statute of Frauds requiring a writing signed by the obligor as proof of
his acknowledgment or promise.10 Comparable statutes are found in most
of our states today,1' and a liberal interpretation of them or of the prin-
ciple behind them would seem to be permissible, especially when it is
remembered that a statute of limitations is a bar to a suit only if pleaded
and that, if pleaded, it merely prevents the enforcement by court action
and does not destroy the moral obligation. 2 Defendant's conduct which
has lulled the plaintiff into a sense of security that he need not sue to
collect should provide the plaintiff with the basis of an estoppel against
8 See note 3 supra.
9 Spencer v. Hemmerde, [1922] 2 A.C. 507, 519, 534.
10 9 Geo. 4, c. 14 (1929).
11 E.g., N.Y.CYPA. § 59:
An acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing signed by the party to be charged
thereby is the only competent evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take
a case out of the operation of the provisions of the articles relating to the limitations of
time within which an action must be brought other than for the recovery of real prop-
erty. But this section does not alter the effect of a payment of principal or interest.
Scheuer v. Scheuer, 308 N.Y. 447, 126 N.E.2d 555 (1955) (estoppel cannot be based on a
parol representation).
12 Cf. Livesay v. First National Bank, 57 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App. 1933), and Note, 91
A.L.R. 876 (1934), to the effect that -the mere fact that an obligation has become legally
unenforceable by discharge in bankruptcy or the running of the statute of limitations does
not destroy the creditor's insurable interest in the life of the debtor.
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the plea of the statute of limitations or an equitable replication to such a
plea. 3 However, the attitude of courts is far from uniform. A few illus-
trations should be sufficient to demonstrate this.
The House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, found the following
letter from debtor to creditor sufficient to take the case out of the opera-
tion of the statute:
It is not that I won't pay you, but that I can't do so. It is important that
I should see you and explain the situation, and I shall therefore ring you up
tomorrow to make an appointment.
What I wrote you was not that I saw no prospect at present of being able
to pay the capital, but that I saw no prospect of being able to repay the
capital at present. The condition of things at the Bar is such that the vast
majority of us will be getting into debt rather than out of it.
I have a good deal to talk to you about, and nothing can be gained by
flying to solicitors. 14
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Georgia found the following
facts insufficient to estop the defendant from pleading the statute.15 A
director of a bank had given it his notes. From time to time after he was
in default, he told his associate directors that he would pay the debt.
After his death, his executors found writings stating that he desired them
to pay these notes from his estate, referring to them as notes "outlawed"
by the statute of limitations. The court felt bound to apply the statute
strictly and not create exceptions to it even though "[a] dherence to them
[statutes of limitations] sometimes brings harsh and what may seem to be
inequitable results." It said:
His associates in dealing with him with reference to his own obligations
were dealing at arms length as if he were a stranger to the board [citations
omitted], and while they may, as alleged, have had confidence in his integrity
and have believed that he would pay them, yet they, as he, knew the statute
was running. They allowed it to run. They could easily have secured a
promise not to plead the statute, or a new written promise to pay. It was
their duty to collect the note as well as his duty to pay it.1'
In a New York case, it was held that letters signed by the obligor's
attorneys offering a compromise settlement of the claim were acknowl-
edgments sufficient to toll the statute, and it was said that evidence is
13 Holloway v. Appelget, 55 NJ. Eq. 584, 585, 40 AtI. 27, 28 (Ct. Err. & App. 1897)
(injunction granted against defendant pleading the statute of limitations in an action brought
at law by plaintiff against defendant, the court saying: "There, however, is no reason why
a court of equity should not, by the use of its injunctive power,-disarm a defendant from
using the statute fraudulently in an action at law.")
14 Spencer v. Hemmerde, [1922] 2 A.C. 507.
15 Bank of Jonesboro v. Carnes, 187 Ga. 795, 2 S.E.2d 495 (1939).
16 Id. at 802, 2 S.E.2d at 499. The court added:
What we now hold is that neither the conduct nor the relationship out of which it grew
is sufficient in law to set up such an estoppel, and that the statute must be applied,
because we do not believe that courts of law are justified in reading into the law excep-
tions not contained in it, nor do we think they may nullify the statute simply because
they think it inequitable to apply it in a given case.
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admissible to identify the indebtedness referred to in the writings.17 But
a Delaware court attributed this decision to the existence of section 59 of
the New York Civil Practice Act18 and held that a letter from the debtor's
attorney requesting a compromise offer of settlement was not a sufficient
acknowledgment of an alleged debt, implying a promise to pay, to remove
the bar of the statute. The letter was admitted to be an indication of some
business transaction between the parties but could not be construed, the
court said, to constitute an unqualified and direct admission of a previous
subsisting debt.19 In another Delaware case, plaintiff bought from defend-
ant a truck crane warranted to lift twenty tons. After using it for a year
and a half he found it would not lift twenty tons and then complained to
the defendant. It was held that the defendant by sending a representative
to attempt to repair the crane so that it would have the warranted capac-
ity did not thereby admit that the warranty had been broken so as to toll
the statute2 0
In cases of this type, the courts which have decided in favor of the
plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is valid legal reasoning that
escapes insistence on rigid formalism and avoids results that are harsh and
inequitable. Courts imbued with the spirit of equity can and should, when
sitting on a law case, measure justice by the same ethical standards that
have characterized their administration of equity.
The Doctrine of Balancing Interests
Another example of the perpetuation of the separateness of law and
equity is found in connection with the defense of the balance of interests
which a court sitting in equity will weigh when determining whether, in its
discretion, an injunction or some alternative relief should be granted. The
New York Court of Appeals had before it an ejectment suit in which the
defendant set up what was styled an equitable defense supported by the
following facts. The defendant had evicted the plaintiff by summary pro-
ceedings and, before it could be decided by the Court of Appeals that the
eviction was wrongful, tore down the building and upon that site and the
17 Brill v. Brandt, 176 Misc. 580, 26 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 263
App. Div. 811, 31 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 581, 43 NYE.2d 718 (1942).
18 See note 11 supra.
19 Pilch v. Gray, 111 A.2d 835 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955).
20 Gaffney v. Unit Crane and Shovel Corp., 117 A.2d 237 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955).
Note on estoppel to rely on the statute of limitations, 130 A.L.R. 8 (1941). Similar problems
as to whether there is an acknowledgement of the obligation sufficient to toll the statute arise
when the obligor furnishes his creditor with room and board, gasoline, services, or the like,
the value of which is to be credited on the debt. See Note, 139 A.L.R. 1378 (1942). In
MacKeen v. Kasinskas, - Mass. -, 132 N.E.2d 732 (1956) (representations of Insurance




adjoining lot built a theatre at a cost of over $100,000. The defendant
said it was solvent and ready to pay any loss sustained by the plaintiff.
In reversing the lower courts which had held the defense to be good, the
court said:
The plaintiff does not sue in equity, and is not asking for relief which the
court is free in its discretion to concede or to withhold. Such cases as
McCann v. Chasm Power Co. (211 N. Y. 301), where the relief demanded
was the discretionary remedy of injunction, are thus beside the point ....
The defendant does not make out an equitable defense unless upon the same
facts, in the days when equitable defenses were unknown in actions of eject-
ment (Jackson v. Pierce, 2 Johns. 221), it might have maintained a suit in
equity to enjoin the prosecution of the remedy at law (Dyke v. Spargur, 143
N.Y. 651).21
Even if a court sitting at law has no discretion to grant or withhold
relief, it can give effect to valid defenses and there are ample precedents
for the power to recognize new defenses. For example, the law took over
the equitable view that fraud in inducement and payment should consti-
tute good defenses to actions upon sealed instruments. The equitable
invention of estoppel may be interposed as a legal defense. And we have
already seen that, under the Federal Judicial Code, laches may be used
as an "equitable defense." It is true that the doctrine of balancing
interests is, like laches, set up as a defense to a suit for equitable relief.
But the court's statement that the statutory authority for equitable
defenses permits such defenses only when upon the same facts the defend-
ant might have maintained a suit in equity to enjoin the prosecution of the
remedy at law, is certainly open to question.2" But even if the statute
were so restrictively construed, in New Jersey, at the time when courts of
law and equity were separate, an injunction was granted restraining the
defendant from the prosecution of an ejectment suit to recover land upon
which the plaintiff had mistakenly encroached 3 In addition to enjoining
the prosecution of the ejectment suit, the defendant was ordered to release
to complainant the land in dispute on payment of the market value by
complainant.
It is the statements quoted from the opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals that are subject to question rather than the decision itself because
there are indications in the opinion that even if the defense had been held
good, the balance of interests would have been found to weigh in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant.
21 Golde Clothes Shop, Inc. v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 236 N.Y. 465, 469, 141 N.E.
917, 918 (1923), Notes, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 337, 342 (1925); 24 Colum. L. Rev. 428 (1924);
33 Yale L.J. 660 (1924).
22 Note, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 337 (1925).
23 Magnolia Construction Co. v. McQuillan, 94 NJ. Eq. 736, 121 AtlI. 734 (Ct. Err. & App.
1923). In Dorfman v. Lieb, 102 N.J. Eq. 492, 141 Ati. 581 (Ch. 1928), an injunction was
granted against the execution of a judgment in an ejectment suit.
[Vol. 41
A PLEA FOR EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
Part Performance and the Statute of Frauds
Another doctrine which, because it was of purely equitable origin, is
said to have no place in an action for damages, is the doctrine that part
performance of an oral contract will estop the defendant from pleading
the Statute of Frauds. The purpose of the doctrine is to keep the statute,
designed to prevent fraud, from being used as an instrument of fraud.
Pomeroy said in his second edition of Equity Jurisprudence, section 2240:
The doctrine of part performance is purely a creation of equity and is not
recognized at law. Hence it follows that no distinctively legal action can be
maintained upon an oral contract within the Statute of Frauds.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut cited this statement with
approval in an action brought to recover damages for the loss of an equity
of redemption.24 Plaintiff, as executrix, had given a mortgage to the
defendant bank. Subsequently, it was orally agreed that the bank would
foreclosei buy in the property, convey it to plaintiff who would then give
the bank a new mortgage in her individual capacity. After thus acquiring
title, the bank sold it to other parties for prices alleged to be less than the
real value. Plaintiff relied upon the fact that she had remained in posses-
sion and, with the knowledge and consent of defendant, had made
improvements. The defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds and moved
for a non-suit on the ground that the doctrine of part performance was
unavailing to take the contract out of the statute. With this the court
agreed even though it said: "We are disposed to share the evident view
of the trial court and jury that the plaintiffs have been hardly dealt with
by the defendant."25 Nevertheless, the court saw a way to give effect to
the principles of equity and dropped the suggestion that "had the plain-
tiffs claimed that the defendants were estopped to take advantage of the
Statute of Frauds . . .a different question would be presented." '
Thereupon, the plaintiff came back with a complaint appropriately
amended to raise the estoppel and the court this time upheld a denial of
defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, saying that "while there is a conflict of authority, a number of
well considered cases hold that where a plaintiff has acted solely in
reliance on the oral agreement an estoppel may be raised to defeat the
statute."27 The court was cautious to suggest that "the determination of
24 Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 122 Conn. 507, 191 AtL 88 (1937).
25 Id. at $13, 191 At. at 90.
28 Id. at 513, 191 At]. at 91.
27 Wolfe v. Wallingford Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 513, 1 A.2d 146, 149 (1938).
Accord, Seymour v. Oelichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909). See Summers, "The Doctrine
of Estoppel as Applied to Statute of Frauds," 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 440 (1931); Notes, 36 Calif.




the case as now presented requires no recognition of a right in the plain-
tiffs to relief by estoppel beyond one coextehsive with that available to
her under the doctrine of partial performance had she proceeded in equity
instead of law, and our decision is restricted accordingly. ' 28
However, there are decisions which have gone beyond the limitations
indicated by the Connecticut court. Thus, in a New York case, three
promoters, of whom the defendant was one, orally agreed to organize the
plaintiff corporation, to invest equally in its stock and to convey a hotel
property to it. In an action for damages, the complaint alleged complete
performance of this agreement except that the defendant refused to make
his investment or to convey his interest in the property and repudiated
his stock subscription after the shares had been delivered to and accepted
by him. In upholding a denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, the
court said that the facts alleged disclosed a situation where the protection
of the Statute of Frauds would work a fraud upon the plaintiff, its
creditors and its incorporators.
True the action is one at law for damages proximately arising out of
defendant's failure to honor his oral engagements. But it is also true that
the doctrine of estoppel in pais, although of equitable origin, is available
at law. [Citing authorities]. Here facts capable of constituting the estoppel
are pleaded and may be regarded as an element of the cause of action. It
was permissible to plead them to preclude the defense (Feinberg v. Allen,
143 App. Div. 866, affd. 208 N. Y. 215), and in many jurisdictions it has
been held that to serve that end it is necessary to do so. (120 A. L. R.
9-33).--
A wrongfully discharged employee was permitted to recover an orally
agreed -bonus on the ground that, having given up his former position and
accepted employment with the defendant in reliance upon the oral
28 124 Conn. at 515, 1 A.2d at 150.
29 Wikiosco, Inc. v. Proller, 276 App. Div. 239, 241, 94 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (3d Dep't 1950).
It was said that the pertinent statute was N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 259, which requires a signed
memorandum of a contract to sell real property. It is to be noted that § 270 provides:
"Nothing contained in this article abridges the power of courts of equity to compel the
specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance." The wording of the
exception in the Iowa statute seems broad enough to cover both suits in equity and actions
at law. Iowa Code § 62222 (1954) :
Except when otherwise specifically provided, no evidence of the following enumerated
contracts is competent, unless it be in writing and signed by the party charged or his
authorized agent:
. "3. Those for the creation or transfer of any interest in lands, except leases for a term
not exceeding one year....
Section 622.33:
The provisions of subsection 3 of section 622.32 do not apply where the purchase money
or any portion thereof, has been received by the vendor, or when the vendee, with the
actual or implied consent of the vendor, has taken and held possession of the premises
under and by virtue of the contract, or when there is any other circumstance which, by
the law heretofore in force, would have taken the case out of the statute of frauds.
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promise, it would be unconscionable to apply the statute3 ° And damages
have been recovered for breach of an oral contract for the purchase and
sale of livestock of a value of over $500 for the reason that the expendi-
ture of large sums of money by the plaintiff in the course of executing the
contract raised an estoppel against the defense of the statute31
Conditional Performances: Time as of the Essence
When we come to equity's practice of looking at the substance rather
than the letter of a contract and considering whether a time set for per-
formance was really of the essence, we find again adequate grounds for
departing ,from the time-honored principle that time is always of the
essence in an action at law.
Pomeroy wrote:
The ground of the rule concerning time and the effect of delay is often said
to be the principle that time in equity is not generally material. At law it
is otherwise; for the plaintiff suing upon a contract, must show that he has
done all the acts on his part within the prescribed time where such period is
fixed by stipulation, and within a reasonable time, where there is no stipula-
tion upon the subject.32
In England, with respect to land contracts, section 41 of the 1925 Law
of Property Act provides:
Stipulations in a contract as to time or otherwise, which according to rules
of equity are not deemed to be of the essence of the contract, are also con-
strued and have effect at law in accordance with the same rules. 3
Section 10 of the 1893 English Sale of Goods Act reads:
(1) Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract,
stipulations as to time of payment are not deemed to be of the essence of a
contract of sale. Whether any other stipulation as to time is of the essence
of the contract or not depends on the terms of the contract 3 4
30 Montgomery v. Moreland, 205 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1953).
31 Union Packing Co. v. Cariboo Land & Cattle Co., 191 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
32 Pomeroy, Specific Performance § 371 (3d ed. 1926). See dictum of Lord Romilly in
Parkin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59, 65, 51 Eng. Rep. 698, 701 (Ch. 1852):
At law, time is always of the essence of the contract. When any time is fixed for the
completion of it, the contract must be completed on the day specified, or an action will
lie for the breach of it. This is not the decision of a court of equity....
Professor Corbin suggests that:
The idea that time is of the essence at common law, and that at law a contractor cannot
maintain suit for the price or for damages unless he has rendered full performance of his
own part in every detail may have originated in erroneous statements by the chancellors,
who felt strongly the injustice of denying recovery to a contractor who has rendered
substantial performance and who assumed that the more tough-minded common lawjudges -would fail to see the injustice.
3 Corbin, Contracts § 713, at 798-99 (1951).
33 20 Halsbury's Statutes of England 510 (2d ed. 1950). This supersedes the Judicature
Act, 1873, § 25(7).
34 22 Halsbury's Statutes of England 991 (2d ed. 1950).
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In some of our states, statutes dealing with the interpretations of con-
tracts generally, provide that: "Time is never to be considered of the
essence of the contract unless by its terms expressly so provided." 5
But are these enabling statutes necessary to empower a judge sitting at
law to interpret a contract, and contract obligations, in the same manner
that he would if the plaintiff had asked for equitable rather than legal
relief? 6 Whether the action is brought at law or in equity, the plaintiff
will allege performance of all conditions on his part, or his readiness to
perform them. The defendant's answer will then raise the issue whether
the plaintiff's late performance, or tender, or technical breach is not fatal
to the maintenance of his suit, i.e., does not establish a failure of per-
formance of conditions to be performed by the plaintiff. The court then,
to produce a result that will be fair to the parties, looks behind the letter
of the contract to the real meaning of the parties. If it finds that neither
the language used nor the surrounding circumstances make the stated
time for performance essential within the contemplation of the parties, it
may rightly conclude that the plaintiff has made or tendered substantial
performance of what was intended and that, as a consequence, the defend-
ant has not been released from his obligation to perform. To give the
plaintiff relief is fair especially if the judgment allows the defendant
damages, compensation or abatement for whatever slight loss he has been
caused by plaintiff's delay or technical default. A law court has the same
power.37 When specific performance of a land contract is required and
the court finds that the time stated for the performance is not of the
essence, the court is not remaking the contract, it is only doing justice in
35 2 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 13-724 (1947) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 174 (1937) ; SM.
Code § 10.0107 (1937). Cf. ND. Rev. Code § 9-0723 (1943): "Time is of the essence of a
contract if it is provided expressly by the terms of the contract or if such was the intent of
the parties as disclosed thereby." In a dictum in Sunshine Cloak & Suit Co. v. Roquette
Bros., 30 N.D. 143, 148, 152 N.W. 359, 361 (1915), the court said:
It is doubtless true, as applicant contends, that time is never considered as of the essence
of a contract, unless by its terms it is expressly so provided; in fact this is a statutory
provision in this state.
It may be questioned whether provisions contained in the Uniform Commercial Code do not
exclude the possibility of finding time not of the essence. See p. 364 infra.
36 3 Corbin, Contracts § 715, at 804-05 (1951), referring to these state statutes, says:
The statute makes it clear that merely promising to ship by a named date is not per se
sufficient to make that time of the essence; this should be clear without the statute, but
the contrary is often stated as a rule at law.
37 The damages can be awarded if defendant amends his pleadings to counterclaim for
them or if granted as part of a conditional judgment. Cf. Fairlawn Heights Co., Inc. v.
Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E.2d 1 (1938), where it was held that a vendor can maintain
an action at law for the recovery of the purchase price if he tenders a deed and keeps that
tender good. The court cited precedents from 13 states and reasoned that the abolition of
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity justified its holding. But the Ohio
court held for the defendant on the ground that the title tendered was questionable.
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accordance with the real intention of the parties. There can be only one
true intention and, therefore, it should be found to be the same if plaintiff
asks for damages rather than specific performance. The fact that we are
now operating under a merged system of law and equity furnishes another
reason for having but one interpretation. The aim should be justice with
fairness.
An effective and authoritative repudiation of the notion that "at law,
time is always of the essence of a contract" will be found in Corbin on
Contracts, chapter 34.
By the blind eye of the common law, it would seem, "time" is read as a
master word in the contract jungle, absolute and uncompromising in its
significance and power. It can be asserted with confidence that never were
the common law judges so blind as this ... . They stated no such dogmatic
and almost meaningless rule of thumb as that "time is always of the essence
of a contract at common law." Here, as in other connections, much confu-
sion is due to the very common failure to distinguish (1) between a promise
and a condition, and (2) between an express condition and a constructive
condition.3 8
Professor Corbin reminds us of the historical evolution. When con-
tracts were first enforced at common law, the mutual promises were
regarded as independent and plaintiff might maintain an action against
the defendant without having to allege performance on his side. To over-
come this condition of unfairness, it was eventually held that the promises
should be regarded as mutually dependent.39 Williston points out that this
is a "constructive dependency" imputed to achieve justice and is not
always dependent upon or consistent with actual intention.4 In a bilat-
eral contract it is only fair, and it is intended that there be a reciprocal
exchange of performances. But the rule of constructive dependence does
not exclude the possibility of substantial, if not literal, performance by
the plaintiff. As Corbin says:
[The rule that mutual promises were independent] was not displaced by a
rule that a promisor who had failed in the least degree, or for the least time
to perform his promise cannot maintain suit. Instead, it was laid down that
the defendant is not discharged unless the plaintiff's failure goes to the
whole consideration and is not compensable in damages.41
38 3 Corbin, Contracts § 713 (1951).
39 Id. §§ 709, 713.
40 3 Williston, Contracts § 827 (Williston & Thompson rev. ed. 1936):
But the theory of mutual dependency of the promises in a bilateral contract is based on
fundamental principles of justice, and if the court conceives of its action in enforcing
such dependency as due not to the will of the parties but to the inherent justice of the
situation, there is no difficulty in so applying and molding the principle of failure of
consideration as to protect the defendant without subjecting the plaintiff to the risk of
unjust forfeiture. Therefore, promises will be regarded as constructively dependent when-
ever it is possible to do so.
41 3 Corbin, Contracts § 713 (1951).
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Professor Corbin believes that in most cases where it is stated that time
is always of the essence at law, the plaintiff's failure to perform was
actually a substantial failure. In actions for damages for the breach of
contracts for the sale of goods, custom or particular facts may be grounds
for insisting upon prompt and literal performance, for interpreting the
time set as of the essence. But this may not always be so and does not
justify an arbitrary and general rule that time is always of the essence in
such contracts.43
One wonders whether the Uniform Commercial Code does not classify all
commercial contracts for the sale of goods as belonging to a single category
in which the reciprocal promises and performances are presumed to have
been intended to be dependent and conditional, leaving no alternative but
to find that time is always intended to be of the essence.44 If so, the Code
seems to contemplate a commercial usage that is different from the one
regulated by the English Sale of Goods Act which provides that stipula-
tions as to time of payment are not deemed to be of the essence unless a
different intention appears in the contract and that whether any other
42 Ibid.
43 2 Williston, Sales §§ 451-53 (rev. ed. 1948). In § 453 it is said:
It is obvious that in any contract one party may make his promise expressly conditional
on the exact performance of any agreed condition, and therefore performance on a
specified day or hour, or before a specified day may be'made such a condition. So that
the first point to be determined in an inquiry whether time is of the essence in a par-
ticular case, is whether the parties have in terms made it so. And it is only when this
question has been decided in the negative that any rule of law other than one of interpre-
tation is called into play. Often the defendant has not made his promise to perform
expressly conditional on the plaintiff's performance not later than the fixed day or within
a fixed period; he may have contented himself with exacting from the plaintiff a promise
or performance not later than a fixed day or within a fixed period. Neither the parties
themselves nor the courts always pay much attention to this distinction between a con-
dition and a promise, because performance by one party of his promise is so often an
implied condition of the duty of the other.
44 Uniform Commercial Code art. 2, Sales, pt. 3, §§ 2-301, 2-507, and 2-511. Note that
§ 2-508 permits a seller who has made a non-conforming tender to make a conforming delivery
if he does so within the contract time for performance, and that under § 2-605, which pro-
vides that a buyer is regarded as waiving an ascertainable "defect" unless his rejection is
accompanied by a particularization of the defects, the word "defect" seems not intended to
include a delay in tender beyond the contract time. Section 2-615 gives the seller an excuse
for delay in delivery "if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency'the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made or by the compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic govern-
mental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be valid." Section 1-204(3) pro-
vides: "An action is taken 'seasonably' when it is taken at or within the time agreed or if no
time is agreed at or within a reasonable time," and § 1 of this section reads: "Wherever this
Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, the agreement may fix any time
which is not manifestly unreasonable." As bearing further upon the conditional aspect of the
obligations it may be noted that § 2-601 gives the buyer the right to accept or reject "if the
goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract." This would
include default in performing at the agreed time.
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stipulation as to time is of the essence will depend on the terms of the
contract.45
Section 2-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the
buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the terms of the Contract.
In explanation of this section, the comment reads in part:
This section uses the term "obligation" in contrast to the term "duty" in
order to provide for the "condition" aspects of delivery and payment insofar
as they are not modified by other sections of this Article such as those on
cure of tender.
There is this added comment:
In order to determine what is "in accordance with contract" under this
Article usage of trade, course of dealing and performance, and the general
background of circumstances must be given due consideration in conjunction
with the lay meaning of the words to define the scope of the conditions and
duties.
Section 2-507 reads:
(1) Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to accept the
goods and unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them. Tender
entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to
the contract.
(2) Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of
goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose
of them is conditional upon his making the payment due.
It is explained in the Comment that:
The "unless otherwise agreed" provision of subsection (1) is directed pri-
marily to cases in which payment in advance has been promised or a letter
of credit term has been included. Payment "according to the contract" con-
templates immediate payment, payment at the end of an agreed credit term,
payment by a time acceptance or the like.
As to subsection (2), it:
deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the seller and in
such a situation makes the buyer's "right as against the seller" conditional
upon payment.
The converse situation is covered by section 2-511 (1):
Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition to the seller's
duty to tender and complete any delivery.
Of course, under the principles applied where time is found not to be of
the essence, a plaintiff who is slightly in default must tender substantial
performance as a condition of the defendant's obligation to perform. But
the problem which seems to be presented by these sections of the Coin-
45 22 Halsbury's Statutes of England 991 (2d ed. 1950).
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mercial Code is whether these sections do not make performances
expressly rather than constructively"' conditional. If so, all agreements
for the purchase and sale of goods made pursuant to the Code and
impledly incorporating these provisions, will be regarded as expressly
making time of the essence. This interpretation would bar a plaintiff, both
at law and in equity, from enforcing any agreement governed by the Code
by tendering substantial performance. The defendant would always have
available the defense that plaintiff's performance had not been precisely
according to the letter of the contract.
Relieving against Hard Bargains and Forfeitures
In a suit for specific performance of a contract, equity will listen to the
defense that, because of the terms of the contract itself or because of sub-
sequent events, specific execution would result in hardship and oppression
to the defendant. Sometimes, but not always, such cases present concomi-
tant facts of overreaching, mistake or non-disclosure of material facts. In
denying specific relief, the court may indicate that it is not questioning
the validity of the contract or the availability of plaintiff's legal remedy4 7
assuming "that the more toughminded common law judges would fail to
see the injustice.14 8 But even centuries ago, the common law judges were
not that toughminded. Professor Corbin cites two early cases. 49 In one,
the defendant had agreed to pay for a horse at the rate of "a barley corn
a nail, doubling it every nail." The 32 nails in the horses hoofs, when
doubled with each nail, came to 500 quarters of barley. The jury was
instructed to bring in a verdict for the value of the horse. Their verdict
was for £80 In the second case, the verdict was for the reasonable value
although the price, if calculated as the contract required, would have been
524,288 quarters of rye.P1
Long ago, equity amended the law of mortgages. Finding that the real
purpose of the mortgage was to obtain security against a possible default,
it overrode the express provision for forfeiture in the event of default and
46 See notes 40,43 supra. 3 Corbin, Contracts § 715 (1951):
But the vendor can make his duty to convey expressly conditional upon a payment on
or before a specified day or hour; and the purchaser can make his duty to pay expressly
conditional upon conveyance by a specific time. Such a result is not achieved by merely
promising to pay or to convey on a stated day; either party can achieve it by making his
own promise expressly conditional upon such an exact performance by the other.
47 Mark v. Gates, 154 Fed. 481 (9th Cir. 1907); Koch v. Streuter, 232 InI. 594, 83 NX.
1072 (1908); Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 85 N.E. 839 (1908); 5 Corbin, Contracts
§ 1162 (1951).
48 See quotation from Corbin, note 32 supra.
49 3 Corbin, Contracts 156 n. 18 (1951).
50 James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1675).
51 Thornborough v. Whiteacre, 2 Ld. Reym. 1164, 6 Mod. 305, 91 Eng. Rep. 715 (K.B
1706).
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created and protected the debtor's equity of redemption. A comparable
situation exists when a land contract provides for payment of the price in
installments, for retention of the title by the vendor until the last install-
ment has been paid, stipulates that time is of the essence and that, in the
event of default in any payment, the vendor shall be discharged and entitled
to retain all payments made and to re-enter possession if it has been given
to the purchaser. Usually, equity will relieve against such forfeitures by
permitting specific performance at the suit of the purchaser,52 or by
denying the vendor's petition for cancellation of the contract for default
in the installment payments, if, when the suit was commenced, the buyer
tendered payment of all installments due, with interest. 3
Courts of law have to pass on the question of forfeiture under such
contracts when the purchaser seeks to recover his down payments and thus
prevent a forfeiture. The majority rule has been against the purchaser.54
It is reasoned that he is the wrongdoer, the seller is the injured party.
Why, therefore, should one who has freely entered a contract be permitted
it ignore its terms when he is in default? No one questions the vendor's
right to compensatory or even to liquidated damages in a reasonable
amount, and that, in any event, the purchaser should be able to recover
no more than the excess over such damages.6 5 The issue is with respect
to that excess only. "Where the transaction is in its essence a mortgage,
agreements for forfeiture and provisions that time is of the essence should
be given no more weight than similar provisions in a mortgage,"5 and
"the buyer's right of return, if he ever has such a right, is given him by
law necessarily in opposition to the terms of the contract."5 7 Some juris-
dictions have upheld this view,58 one court saying,
52 Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige 352 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (two-thirds of the price had been
paid and the purchaser had made extensive improvements) ; Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich.
193 (1864). The rule is otherwise in some states, Heckard v. Sayre, 34 Ill. 142 (1864). Simpson,
"Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion," 44 Yale LJ. 754, 774-79 (1935);
3.Williston, Contracts § 791 n. 14,15 (Williston & Thompson rev. ed. 1936).
53 Dependability Homes, Inc. v. White, 161 Ohio App. 118, 117 N.E.2d 706 (1951).
54 Extensive annotation in 31 A.L.R.2d 8 (1953).
55 5 Corbin, Contracts §§ 1132-35 (1951).
56 3 Williston, Contracts 2229 (Williston & Thompson rev. ed. 1936).
57 Id. at 2226.
58 Cases collected 31 A.L.R.2d 19 (1953).
Restatement, Contracts § 357 (1932):
Restitution in favor of plaintiff who is himself in default.
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and is justified therein
by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance of a condition, but the plaintiff
has rendered a part performance under the contract that is a net benefit to the defendant,
the plaintiff can get judgment except as stated in Sub-section (2), for the amount of such
benefit in excess of the harm that he caused to the defendant by his own breach,
in no case exceeding a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation, if
(a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance is not wilfull or deliberate; or
1956]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Whatever reason may be alleged the desirability and fairness of the
result are clear. There is an instinctive revolt against making the vendor
more than whole as a result of vendee's misfortune in being unable to com-
plete his contract.59
This is an attitude consistent with the long established rule and under-
standing as to the effect of a bond or mortgage. There are precedents for
the refusal of courts of law to give effect to contractual provisions that are
illegal or contrary to good policy, for example, with respect to provisions
for penalties, as distinguished from liquidated damages.0 0
The Uniform Commercial Code has an interesting section 2-302, which
as amended reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable clauses and
enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties may be afforded a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose,
and effect to aid the court in making the determination.61
The Commercial Code also provides specifically in section 2-718 that
a contract term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as
a penalty, and that "a 'deposit' or 'down' or part payment of more than
20 per cent of the price or $500, whichever is smaller, to be forfeited on
breach, is so forfeited only to the extent that it is a reasonable liquidation
of the damages...."
As the above discussion indicates, justice can sometimes be done by
(b) the defendant, with knowledge that the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-
performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter occur, assents to the
rendition of the part performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or retains
property received although its return in specie is still not unreasonably difficult
or injurious.
(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his part performance if it is merely
a payment of earned money, or if the contract provides that it may be retained and it
is not so greatly in excess of the defendant's harm that the provision is rejected as
imposing a penalty.(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit from the plaintiff's part performance is
the amount by which he has been enriched as a result of such performance unless the
facts are those stated in Sub-section (1b), in which case it is the price fixed by the con-
tractor for such part performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable proportion of the
total contract price.
59 Dooley v. Stillson, 46 RI. 332,340,128 Atl. 217, 220 (1925).
60 3 Williston, Contracts § 776-80 (Williston & Thompson rev. ed. 1936). In a few
states, there are statutes compelling the vendor to give the purchaser a period of grace after
his default before terminating the contract. Iowa Code §§ 656.1-656.6 (1954); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 559.21 (1947); N ). Rev. Code §§ 9-0803, 32-1802-06 (1943); S.D. Code § 37.3103
(1939). Simpson, "Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion," 44 Yale L.
754, 777-78 (1935).
61 Uniform Commercial Code, Supp. No. 1 (1955). This section seems intended to apply
whether a suit is brought at law or in equity.
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ignoring the harsh features of the contract. At other times, it is done by
searching for the real intent of the patties and giving the words used a
liberal interpretation. Thus, when a lease provided for a rent to be com-
puted at a specific percentage of the department store business done by
the lessee "in said building," and the lessee moved a part of his business
to an adjoining building owned by another but reached through the
lessor's building or to which customers were diverted from the lessor's
building, the lessor was allowed to recover a rental on the basis of the
business done outside as well as inside said building.62
In denying specific performance of a contract for the sale of a crop of
tomatoes because the court regarded the terms of the contract as too
one-sided and harsh, Judge Goodrich expressed the difference usually
supposed to exist between law and equity: "As already said, we do not
suggest that the contract is illegal. All we say is that the sum total of its
provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist." 3
Cannot the court sitting at law be a court of conscience? If the buyer
sued the seller for damages for a breach of this same contract, could not
the court suggest that the harshness of the bargain could be raised by an
equitable defense? Judge Frank, dissenting in another case, taking issue
with the quoted statement of Judge Goodrich, wrote:
• .. the court refused to grant specific performance of an unfair contract
of "adhesion" but indicated that it would rule differently in a suit "at law."
It is difficult to see why such a ruling should be thus restricted. Our legal
history discloses numerous instances in which "equitable" doctrines as to
unfairness or the like have been adapted at "law." [Citing precedents.] 4
SuMMAY
The examples which have been used here to illustrate how principles of
equity can be and, by some courts, have been applied in actions for legal
relief are not to be regarded as the only ones that could have been
advanced for this purpose. They show merely the possibilities and some
precedents for the adoption of the equitable attitude by courts sitting at
law. The decisions, even when reflecting only a minority point of view,
and their results deserve to be highlighted to emphasize how easily and
how soundly the practice of adopting the equitable attitude in actions at
law can be more generally followed in these and other instances," and
62 Cissna Loan Co. v. Barron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 Pac. 1002 (1928). See also Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc. v. McNair Realty Co., 98 F. Supp. 440 (D. Mont. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 876 (9th
Cir. 1952) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 309 N.Y. 248,128 NXE.2d 401 (1955).
63 Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80,84 (3d Cir. 1948).
64 Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 206 n. 20 (2d Cir. 1955).
65 3 Williston, Contracts § 844 (Williston & Thompson rev. ed. 1936), after discussing
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how easily and soundly the present-day bench and bar can release them-
selves from the strait-jacketed thinking of former times.
II
Inadequacy of the Legal Remedy
We turn now from a consideration of what a court sitting at law may do
to adapt and apply principles of equity to a consideration of what the
court sitting in equity may do to extend equitable remedies.
At the beginning of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, one of the chief
reasons for applying to the Chancellor and one of the chief reasons for
his interference was the inadequacy of the legal remedy. In the ensuing
struggle between the common law and the equity judges, this became the
established boundary of the activity of equity within its so-called con-
current jurisdiction. So, today, one seeking equitable relief must first
establish his legal right, the infringement or threatened infringement of it
and the inadequacy of his legal remedy.
It is not here being suggested that modern courts can or should com-
pletely ignore the limitations placed by the requirement of the inadequacy
of the legal remedy. A system of law which provided for specific relief,
specific performance, or injunction, as the normal procedure and the sub-
stitution of damages as the abnormal might be a more perfect system, 6
the equity practice of granting specific performance with compensation or abatement for
slight and immaterial defects in quantity, quality, or title, says:
It is not improbable that the rule in actions at law may become somewhat ameliorated,
and though one who still can make accurate performance will not be allowed to recover
without tender of such performance, one who has already committed a breach in limine
making exact performance impossible, but who can and does tender performance varying
but slightly from his agreement will be allowed to enforce the agreement at law, the
defendant's right to recoupment or counterclaim being regarded as equivalent to the
compensation which equity requires.
But see Smyth v. Sturges, 108 N.Y. 495, 15 N.E. 544 (1887), purchaser having refused con-
veyance with compensation for fixtures which had been removed, vendor sued for damages,
but it was held that the vendor, being unable to deliver what was promised, could not recover.
66 In a sense, specific relief is the normal form of relief in the civil law system. Neitzel,
"Specific Performance, Injunctions and Damages in German Law," 22 Harv. L. Rev. 161,
162 (1909). After referring to the fact that a claim for damages is the normal remedy in
some systems, the author says:
The conception of the modem German law is quite different. The two leading principles
of it are that every right may be enforced by the courts, and that the purpose of such
enforcement is the creation of the condition which would exist if the right was complied
with voluntarily and without judicial help. In other words, a person has as many actions
as he has rights recognized by the law; the right to sue is nothing else than the formal
aspect of the right itself. Furthermore, the purpose of a lawsuit is to create a situation
or condition which would exist if no violation or infringement of a right had arisen at
all. For instance, a person has hired a horse which is not delivered to him and he sues
for delivery; or, he has entered into a partnership, his partner does not fulfill his part of
the agreement and he sues for specific performance; or, an employee has bound himself
not to compete with his master, he breaks his contract, and his master seeks to enjoin
him; or, finally some one by trespassing on my property has injured it and I sue him to
repair the damage.
Under French law, a contract to convey realty or personalty is, as between the parties,
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but it is not our Anglo-American system. Indeed, the adoption of it
-would lead to constitutional objections that the defendant is being
deprived of his right to a jury trial in an action at law for damages or
that the equity powers of the court as established by the state constitu-
tion can be altered only by a constitutional amendment.
An incident in history bears upon the nature of our problem. In 1616,
when the contest between law and equity was being waged by Lord Coke
and Lord Ellesmere, Coke granted a writ of prohibition against the main-
tenance of a suit for specific performance of a contract for a lease. The
report reads:
Without doubt a court of equity ought not to do so, for then to what
purpose is the action on the case and covenant; and Coke said that this
would subvert the intent of the convenantor since he intended to have his
election to pay damages or to make the lease, and they would compel him
to make the lease against his will; and so it is if a man binds himself in an
obligation to enfeoff another, he cannot be compelled to make the feoff-
ment.67
Of course, a promisor does not, in a proper sense, have a privilege of
electing between performing and paying damages. His honorable obliga-
tion is to perform. He does have a power to do wrong and, if Coke had
succeeded in suppressing equity, his wrongdoing would have subjected
him only to a liability for damages. In fact, it was because the only means
the common law judges had for inducing a compliance with obligations
was the threat of liability for damages resulting from non-compliance that
equity stepped in to order performance with the sanction of contempt
proceedings for those who disobeyed.
equivalent to an actual conveyance. As to obligations to do or not to do something, per-
formance is enforced by imposing progressively increasing penal damages (astreintes) until
the defendant complies with his duty. Thus, an electric light company which wrongfully
terminated its service to plaintiff had damages assessed against it at the rate of 10,000 francs
a day until it restored the service. Upon compliance, the damages may be reduced to a
compensatory measure. This is enforcement in rem rather than in personam. Schlesinger,
Comparative Law -Cases and Materials 262 n. (1950); Amos, "Specific Performance in French
Law," 17 L.Q. Rev. 372 (1901); Walton, "Specific Performance in France, Astreintes," 14
J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l L. (3d ser.) 130 (1937); Krassa, "Interaction of Common Law and
Latin Law: Enforcement of Specific Performance in Louisiana and Quebec," 21 Can. B. Rev.
337 (1943). Pound, "The Theory of judicial Decision," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 647 (1953)
writes:
With us substituted redress is the normal type; specific redress is exceptional and reserved •
for cases for which the former is not adequate. To the civilian, specific redress is the
normal type; substituted redress is to be used only in cases in which specific redress is
not practicable or would operate inequitably. Again, to us these two types of remedy
are so distinct that we think of them commonly as calling for distinct types of proceeding.
But the civilian conceives of the proceeding in the terms of the right asserted, not of the
remedy sought, and so thinks only of what is the practical means of giving effect to that
right. In other words, we think procedurally in terms of the remedy; the civilian thinks
in terms of the asserted right.
67 Bromage v. Genning, 1 Roll. R. 368, 81 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1616). Translation is by
Ames, see Ames, Equity Jurisdiction, pts. I-VI, 38 n. (1904).
1956]'
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY V
Story favored liberality in the granting of specific performance, and
the same reasoning would carry with it liberality in the granting of injunc-
tive relief.
The truth is, that upon the principles of natural justice Courts of Equity
might proceed much farther and might insist upon decreeing a specific per-
formance of all bona fide contracts, since that is a remedy to which Courts
of Law are inadequate. There is no pretence for the complaints sometimes
made by the common lawyers, that such relief in equity would wholly sub-
vert the remedies by actions of the case and actions of covenant; for it is
against conscience that a party should have a right of election whether he
would perform his covenant or only pay damages for the breach of it. But
on the other hand there is no reasonable objection to allowing the other
party who is injured by the breach to have an election either to take
damages at law or to have a specific performance in equity, the remedies
being concurrent but not coextensive with each other. The restriction stands
therefore not so much upon any general principle ex aequo et bono as upon
the general convenience of leaving the party to his remedy in damages at
law, where that will give him a clear and full compensation."s
What is being suggested now is that when we have one court adminis-
tering both legal and equitable remedies there is every reason why that
court should permit a plaintiff to have his requested specific relief, rather
than the substitute of damages, whenever this can be constitutionally
done. It is not unconstitutional to give a liberal rather than a narrow
interpretation of "the inadequacy of the legal remedy."
Consider, for example, the automobile market immediately after World
War II. Manufacturers were reconverting from war production to auto-
mobile production. The output had to be parceled to dealers throughout
the land. A particular dealer received only a few deliveries and those were
spread over a period of time. In August, 1945, when the dealers had as
yet no cars, a dealer accepted plaintiff's written order for a "new Ply-
mouth Club Coupe" at list price at time of delivery, and delivery to be as
soon as possible. Within the ensuing year, the dealer received, sold, and
delivered two other cars of the type contracted for by plaintiff, ignored
plaintiff's repeated demands for delivery to him, and finally informed him
that he could not have a car. Several courts held that the plaintiff could
not have specific performance and would have to be content with
damages.6 9 The adequacy of the remedy of damages is certainly ques-
68 2 Story, Equity jurisprudence § 994 (14th ed. 1918).
69 McAllister v. Patton, 214 Ark. 293, 215 S.W.2d 701 (1948); Poltorak v. Jackson Chev-
rolet Co., 322 Mass. 699, 79 N.E.2d 285 (1948); Kirsch v. Zubalsky, 139 N.J. Eq. 22, 49
A.2d 773 (Ch. 1946); Gellis v. Falcon Buick Co., 191 Misc. 566, 76 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup.
Ct. Kings 'County 1948); Cohen v. Rosenstock Motors Co., 188 Misc. 426, 65 N.Y.S.2d 481
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1946); Goodman v. Henry Caplan, Inc., 188 Misc. 242, 65 N.Y.S.2d
576 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946) ; Kaliski v. Grole Motors, Inc., 69 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1946); Fortner v. Wilson, 202 Okla. 563, 216 P.2d 299 (1950). Cf. Kelley v.
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tionable when the dealer has a virtual monopoly in an under-supplied
market. At least three jurisdictions thought the inadequacy sufficient to
justify granting specific performance."
The New York decisions cited based the denial of specific performance
upon a construction of section 68 of the Uniform Sales Act.7 '
Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained
goods, a court having the power of a court of equity may, if it thinks fit, on
the application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree, direct that the con-
tract shall be performed specifically, without giving the seller the option of
retaining the goods on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may
be unconditional, or otherwise, as to the court may seem just.72
Professor Williston, the draftsman of the Uniform Act, has said:
Courts of equity have very closely restricted their jurisdiction in regard to
contracts for the sale of personal property. It would sometimes promote
justice if the courts were somewhat more ready to allow specific performance
of contracts to sell goods in cases where for any reason damages did not
seem adequate. This section of the act will perhaps dispose courts to enlarge
somewhat the number of cases where specific performance is allowed. 73
In spite of the purpose of the act to induce courts to be more liberal in
the granting of specific performance, the New York courts were impressed
with the words "specific or ascertained goods" and held that a contract for
"one new car [to be manufactured], Make Plymouth, Type Sedan, Year
1946, Color Open," was not a contract for a specific car identified and
agreed upon at the time the contract to sell was made. When the thing
contracted for is to be manufactured or grown, it is, of course, not a
specific and ascertained thing when the contract is made, but surely it
becomes specific and ascertained, when, after being produced, it is deliv-
ered into the dealer's hands. At that point, he is under a contractual obli-
gation to appropriate it to the plaintiff's order of purchase. If the legal
remedy is inadequate because of the inability to procure the same article
Creston Buick Sales Co., 239 Iowa 1236, 34 N.W.2d 299 (1950) (specific performance denied
because price uncertain, date of delivery was in the judgment of defendant, and buyer's
privilege to cancel created lack of mutuality).
70 Heidner v. Hewitt Chevrolet Co., 166 Kan. 11, 199 P.2d 481 (1948) (plaintiff had made
a deposit and was given number 66 on defendant's list; a year and a half later his number
came up but defendant refused to deliver unless plaintiff would turn in a used car as part
payment); Boeving v. Vandover, 240 Mo. App. 117, 218 S.W.2d 175 (1949); De Moss v.
Conart Motor Sales, Inc., 72 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio C.P. 1947), aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 299, 78 N.E.2d
675 (1948).
71 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 149.
72 This section follows, with slight changes in wording, § 52 of the English Sale of Goods
Act, 22 Halsbury's Statutes of England 1014 (2d ed. 1950). The latter section was, in turn,
derived from the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854. In an action of detinue defendant
could substitute damages rather than deliver the chattel. The Common Law Procedure Act
deprived him of that alternative upon application of the plaintiff and in the discretion of
the court.
73 3 Williston, Sales § 601 (rev. ed. 1948).
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elsewhere, should not the vendor be compelled to deliver the identified
article to the buyer?
But more than that, even before the Sales Act, equity granted specific
performance of a contract to sell "all the coal tar that might be produced
at the defendant's gas works at Baltimore, for and during a term of five
years," on the ground that defendant was in a monopoly position and that
damages would be inadequate because speculative.74 The Uniform Act
was not intended to restrict the granting of specific performance where
it had been appropriately granted theretofore, and there have been
decisions since the act where specific performance has been granted of
contracts for the sale of crops to be grown or goods to be manufactured. 5
The corresponding section of the Uniform Commercial Code reads
"specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances" and the complicating Words "specific or
ascertained" were omitted. 6 But the draftsmen continue to express the
hope that the section will be given a liberal interpretation:
The present section continues in general prior policy as to specific per-
formance and injunction against breach. However, without intending to
impair in any way the exercise of the court's sound discretion in the matter,
this Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts have
shown in connection with specific performance of contracts of sale.
74 Equitable Gas Light Co. v. Baltimore Coal Tar & Mfg. Co., 63 Md. 285 (1884) ; Curtice
Brothers Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J. Eq. 831, 66 AtI. 935 (Ch. 1907) (acreage of tomatoes). Though
the Uniform Act was adopted by New Jersey in 1907, it was not mentioned in the opinion.
75 Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, Ill F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (acreage of tomatoes),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Campbell Soup Co. v. Martin, 202 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1953);
Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267, 270 (N.). Cal. ,1951) (five year contract for
peaches, and the court said that by the enictment of the Uniform Act "the State of Califor-
nia unquestionably had in mind the liberalization of the law regarding the specific per-
formance of contracts for the sale of chattels"); Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157
Md. 51, 145 AtI. 378 (1929) (steel scrap accumulating during a period of five years). Cf.
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1949), where the court denied specific
performance because of the unfairness of the contract but stated that otherwise it would
have been specifically enforceable, saying:
judged by the general standards applicable to determining the adequacy of the legal
remedy we think that on this point the case is a proper one for equitable relief. We see
no reason why a court should be reluctant to grant specific relief when it can be given
without supervision of the court or other time-consuming processes against one who has
deliberately broken his contract. [Citing authorities].
See Masterson, "Specific Performance of Contracts to Deliver Specific or Ascertained Goods
under the English Sale of Goods Act and the American Sales Act," Legal Essays in Tribute
to Orrin Kip McMurray (1935), and cases collected 152 A.L.R. 4, 44 (1944); Note, 100
U. Pa. L. Rev. 769 (1952).
76 Section 2-716:
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances. (2) The decree for specific performance may.include such terms and con-
ditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has the right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reason-
ably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been shipped under
reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been made or tendered.
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Political Interests
Equitable relief is sometimes said to be denied on the ground that what
is requested is beyond the authority, the power, or the jurisdiction of an
equity court to grant. It is not a denial based upon the adequacy of an
alternative legal remedy or upon a discretionary decision to withhold the
exercise of a conceded authority to grant relief. It is a denial based upon
a suppose lack of power.
Thus, within the past year, one Illinois court has said that equity's
jurisdiction pertains only to questions of the maintenance of civil rights-
property rights, as distinguished from political rights,7 7 and another has
said that the scope of equity jurisdiction is to enforce or protect civil
rights and property interests and that a court of equity has no jurisdiction
to interfere merely for the prevention of crimes."' But in both of these
instances, as in most of the decisions refusing enforcement of political
rights or the prevention of crimes, these statements as to the limitations
on equity jurisdiction were not the only grounds for denying relief.
The first of these cases was a suit by a police officer to compel selection
of police captains from a "Police Captains' Eligible" list. In addition to
saying that equity has no jurisdiction over political questions, the court
said that the plaintiff had not shown special injury, that a public office is
not property and the prospective fees of an officer are not the property of
the incumbent, and that the civil service commission was vested with
discretion to cancel this list after the expiration of two years.
The second Illinois case cited was an application by licensed chiroprac-
tors to enjoin competition by unlicensed practitioners. In addition to
saying that unlicensed practice was a crime which equity had no jurisdic-
tion to enjoin, the court said that injury to property was the basis of juris-
diction in this case and that licensing was merely protective regulation and
did not vest any property right in those licensed to practice.79
Rights that are political are of various types and not all of them may
be feasibly adjudicated in a civil action. But in Nixon v. Herndon,0
plaintiff sued for $5,000 damages for being denied permission to vote at a
primary election. The defendant had moved to dismiss on the ground that
the subject matter of the suit was political and not within the jurisdiction
of the court. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:
77 Malkin v. City of Chicago, 6 Ill. App. 2d 151, 127 N.E.2d 145 (1955).
78 Burden v. Hoover, 7 Ill. App. 2d 296, 129 N.E.2d 463 (1955).
79 In accord on this point is Mossig v. New Jersey Chiropodists, Inc., 122 N.J. Eq. 382,
194 AtI. 248 (Ch. ,1937). In the majority of jurisdictions, the unlicensed practice of a
profession may be enjoined at the suit of either licensed practitioners or the state. See Notes,
92 A.L.R. 173 (1934) ; 81 AL.R. 292 (1932).
80 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
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The objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more
than a play upon words. Of course the petition concerns political action but
it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage
may be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit
at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years, since Ashby v.
White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320, and has been recognized by this Court.
[Citing cases].
If, as was held, a court has jurisdiction to award damages for a lost right
to vote, it is self-evident that damages, in whatever amount, is a remedy
sufficiently inadequate to justify the exercise of that court's equitable
power to enjoin a threatened refusal of the right to vote. And it has been
so held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which said:
There can be no question, therefore, as to the jurisdiction of the court to
grant injunctive relief, whether the suit be viewed as one under the general
provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1) to protect rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(11) to protect the rights of citizens
of the United States to vote, or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(14) to redress
the deprivation of civil rights.81
It cannot be successfully maintained that this decision is dependent
upon these code provisions conferring upon federal courts an equitable
jurisdiction that would not exist without them. Section 41 provides that
the district courts shall have original jurisdiction:
(1) Of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or equity ...
(14) Of all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be brought by
any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law .. .of any
State, of any right .. .secured by the Constitution of the United States,
or of any right secured by any law of the United States. ... s2
Mr. Justice Holmes, referring to a predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,3
said:
It will be observed, in the first place, that the language of § 1979 does not
extend the sphere of equitable jurisdiction in respect of what shall be held
an appropriate subject matter for that kind of relief. The words are, "shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." They allow a suit in equity only when that
is a proper proceeding for redress, and they refer to existing standards to
81 Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Notes, "Equity Jurisdiction over Political Rights,"
13 Cornell L.Q. 287 (1928) ; 7 Texas L. Rev. 430 (1929).
82 Under the 1948 revision, § 41(14) has become 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952), and has been
revised to read: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute .. .of any State or Territory, subjects ...
any citizen of the United States.. .to the deprivation of any rights... secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
83 See note 82 supra.
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determine what is a proper proceeding. The traditional limits of proceedings
in equity have not embraced a remedy for political wrongs.'
But the grounds assigned for his decision were: a) that, since the
complaint alleged that the state registration system was a fraud on the
United States Constitution, the court should not grant the plaintiff's
request that his name be enrolled on this fraudulent list of voters, and
b) that it would be impracticable to enforce the decree, if granted, and
to supervise an election. 5
Even though the courts say that it is beyond the competence of equity
to protect political rights, their opinions usually indicate that in reality
they are exercising discretion against the use of a power that exists. But
when citizens of a state sought to enjoin an election under what was
alleged to be an illegal system of districting of voters for a congressional
election, it was held that the Constitution conferred authority to insure
fair districting exclusively upon the Congress and the courts may not
intervene because Congress may have been in default in exacting from
the states obedience to its mandate.8 6 Thus, there may be a type of
political action with which the Constitution has barred the courts from
interfering and there may be types with respect to which the Congress
has expressed the expectation that courts will give protection to individ-
uals. In the latter field, there is the usual latitude of judicial discretion
which has always characterized the administration of equitable remedies.
Criminal Jurisdiction of Equity
The New York Court of Appeals has said: "That a court of equity will
not undertake the enforcement of the criminal law, and will not enjoin the
commission of a crime, is a principle of equity jurisdiction that is settled
beyond any question.18 7 It is, of course, equally well settled that this
proposition does not exclude equitable protection of an individual's rights
even though the threatened invasion of those rights may be by acts that
are criminal as well as tortious88 It requires but little reflection to become
convinced of the vulnerability of the main proposition that equity does
not undertake the enforcement of the criminal law. One has only to recall
the growing list of federal and state statutes which proscribe conduct as
84 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).
85 See Justice Frankfurter in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 272 (1939).
86 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Note, "Judicial Interference with Political
Parties," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 92 (1924).
87 People ex rel. Bennett, Attorney General v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 376, 14 N.E.2d 439,
442 (1938).
88 Burden v. Hoover, 7 Ill. App. 2d 296, 129 N.E.2d 463, 465 (1955) "the fact that a
misdemeanor or crime may be involved would not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to protect
the property right," if plaintiff had established one.
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criminal and then provide for enforcement by injunction as well as by
criminal prosecution. This practice and the justification for it are founded
in the ancient law which provided these dual remedies for the abatement
of public nuisances.so However, the practice of enforcement by injunction
has gone beyond the limits of the traditional definition of a public nui-
sance, that is, a use of real property that is detrimental to public interests.
This led Pomeroy in his second edition to say:
While the right of the government to obtain an injunction to restrain
criminal acts is not confined strictly to cases of nuisance, it would seem that
it should be limited to cases closely analogous. Such relief, if applied to
criminal acts in general, would supersede the criminal law and deprive
parties of the right to a jury trial. (Emphasis added.) 90
A more satisfactory rationalization would seem to be this: the state
has an obligation to protect the health and welfare of its citizens; the
precedents for an injunction against a public nuisance furnish only one
example of the protection of public health and welfare but do not restrict
the exercise of the general power to public injuries resulting from nui-
sances only; the state's obligation to the public calls for the same equi-
table relief as a means of enforcing any regulatory statute which has for
its purpose the protection of public health and welfare, even though the
violation of the statute is also made a crime. This generalization seems
warranted by the decisions upholding the enforcement by injunction of
such typical statutes as the Interstate Commerce Act,91 the Sherman
Act, 92 the Volstead Act,93 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,1 the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,9 statutes prohibiting usury,96 and
statutes prohibiting the unlicensed practice of medicine 9 7 The early
89 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 1247-50 (14th ed. 1918); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Juris-
prudence § 1349 (5th ed. 1941).
90 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1894 (2d ed. 1919).
91 34 Stat. 929 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 901 (1952). Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm'n,' 162 U.S. 197 (1896).
92 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Assoc., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
93 United States v. Lockhart, 33 F.2d 597 (D. Neb. 1929).
94 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.9.C. § 201 (1952). McComb v. Jacksonville Paper 'Co., 336
U.S. 187 (1949).
95 56 Stat. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 901 (1952). Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.. 321 (1944).
96 State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929); State ex rel. Goff
v. O'Neill, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N.W. 316 (1939). No criminal penalty was provided in these
cases but the court said that such "a grievous anti-social iniquity" fell within the definition
of a public nuisance. Contra, People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 Pac. 725 (1920)
(no nuisance). Notes, 15 Cornell L.Q. 476 (1930); 30 Colum. L. Rev. 125 (1930); 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 499 (1930); 39 Yale L.J. 590 (1930).
97 People ex rel. Bennett, Attorney General v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 384, 14 N.E.2d 439,
446 (1930):
The power of the court to restrain acts which are dangerous to human life, detrimental to
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nuisance cases established that there were the alternative possibilities of
enforcement by injunction or by indictment, and that there was no impair-
ment of the right to trial by jury if the proceeding was in equity where
trial was by the court and not by jury. It follows that the same is true
when the state is exercising its prerogative to enforce by injunction regu-
latory statutes designed for the protection of public health and welfare. 8
A different problem which may be associated with "the criminal juris-
diction of equity" is whether equity has power to enjoin a criminal prose-
cution under an unconstitutional statute. A New York court said:
It is elementary that "equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement
of the criminal law." That rule has never been departed from in a case in
this state, where a person has been indicted and seeks to avoid a trial on the
indictment by bringing an action in a court of equity to restrain the enforce-
ment of the statute under which he was indicted, on the ground that it was
void. There are at least three ways in which the plaintiffs could raise the
question that the statute for the violation of which they have been indicted
is unconstitutional and void-either by motion to dismiss, by habeas corpus,
or by plea. Those are the methods which always have been followed in this
state. They afford the plaintiff and all others full protection and ample
opportunity to raise the question which it is sought to raise in this action.99
This is a holding only that equity will not enjoin if there is another
adequate remedy, and that there is another adequate remedy if the plain-
tiff in the equity suit has already been indicted. In a dramatically cogent
article criticizing this point of view, Simon Fleischmann demonstrated
that the other remedies available after indictment were not adequate:
that, for practical reasons, it would be difficult for a court to hold a statute
unconstitutional in a habeas corpus proceeding or upon a motion to dis-
miss an indictment; that there was no appeal from a denial of such a
motion and that, consequently, the constitutional question can only be
determined after the ordeal of a trial and upon an appeal from a judgment
of conviction.1°° This being the situation, an injunction should be granted
as a means of settling the constitutional question at the outset and saving
the accused from the ordeal, the obloquy, the damage, and expense that
the public health, and the occasion of great public inconvenience and damage is one that
is possessed by all courts of equity.
98 Cf. Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926) (acquittal on charge of maintaining
a nuisance in violation of the Volstead Act was not a bar to a subsequent equity proceeding
to abate the same nuisance; no double jeopardy).
99 Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App. Div. 242, 246, 194 N.Y. Supp. 225, 228
(4th Dep't), aff'd, 234 N.Y. 542, 138 N.E. 439 (1922). The appellate division held that if
this conclusion were erroneous, still the statute was constitutional. The Court of Appeals
affirmed on the ground that equity will not enjoin prosecution of an indictment and did not
discuss the constitutional question.
100 Fleischmann, "Injunctions Restraining Prosecutions under Unconstitutional Statutes,"
9 A.BAJ. 169 (1923).
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would result from a trial and conviction under an unconstitutional
statute.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, where there
had been several arrests, convictions, and successful appeals from the
judgments of conviction and yet further arrests were being made and
threatened for subsequent violations of an unconstitutional ordinance: "It
is plain that the legal remedies by defending against repeated complaints
and bringing successive actions for malicious prosecution or false arrest
are not adequate," and that the granting of an injunction should be
upheld.'
Of course, the legal remedies enumerated by the New York court will
not exist if there has been no indictment. The courts generally say that
equity will not normally interfere because an arrest or indictment is
threatened but will enjoin when the plaintiff can establish threatened
irreparable injury for which there is no other adequate remedy. The
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Youngl12 is repeatedly cited in
support of the latter view and practice. That was a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to test the validity of an injunction granted to stay the enforce-
ment of alleged confiscatory rates established by a state Railroad
Commission, non-compliance with which would, upon conviction, subject
the offenders to fines and imprisonment. The Court said:
It is further objected that there is a plain and adequate remedy at law
open to the complainants and that a court of equity, therefore, has no juris-
diction in such case. It has been suggested that the proper way to test the
constitutionality of the act is to disobey it, at least once, after which the
company might obey the act pending subsequent proceedings to test its
validity. But in the event of a single violation the prosecutor might not
avail himself of the opportunity to make the test, as obedience to the law
was thereafter continued, and he might think it unnecessary to start an
inquiry. If, however, he should do so while the company was thereafter
obeying the law, several years might elapse before there was a final deter-
rnination of the question, and if it should be determined that the law was
invalid the property of the company would have been taken during that time
without due proceses of law, and there would be no possibility of its
recovery.
Another obstacle to making the test on the part of the company might be
to find an agent or employee who would disobey the law, with a possible fine
and imprisonment staring him in the face if the act should be held
valid ...
Similar reasoning was employed by the Supreme Court in granting an
101 Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 534, 70 N.E.2d 241, 245 (1946). But
see Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), where the court had before it appeals
from both the judgment of conviction and the order granting the injunction against further
arrests and it said that its decision upon the first of these appeals, that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, made the injunction unnecessary.
102 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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injunction against the enforcement of a regulation of the Secretary of
Interior which prohibited fishing in coastal waters adjacent to an Indian
reservation without license from the inhabitants of the reservation.
Affirming the propriety of an injunction where there is no adequate legal
remedy for irreparable injury, the Court found that petitioners would
risk drastic penalties, including forfeiture of boats and equipment, if they
violated the regulation, and yet to stay out of the reserved waters would
entail the loss of profitable operations. 1'
In addition to these situations in which, because of the penal risk
involved, the plaintiffs are reluctant to furnish cause for prosecution by
violating the void law, instances arise when the plaintiffs are threatened
with prosecution for what they have done and are continuing to do,
allegedly in violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation. Here, too,
injunctions have been granted against what would be illegal and irrepa-
rable interference with plaintiff's business if the statute, ordinance, or
regulation is void." 4
Property Rights and Personal Rights
Many of the cases cited in the previous sections, dealing with political
rights and criminal jurisdiction, refer to a supposed rule which limits
equity to the protection of property rights and denies it jurisdiction to
protect personal rights. In fact, some of the opinions mention this as one
ground for the decisions. For example, in the Illinois decision denying
protection to a claim to a political office, the court belabored the point
that a public office is not property,0 5 and in the other Illinois case, it was
said that the plaintiff's license to practice a profession was not property.'"
As typical of the view that has been parrotted and applied to restrict
equity jurisdiction since Lord Eldon's colloquy with counsel in Gee v.
Pritchard0 7 one hundred and forty years ago, we may quote the Maryland
court in Chappell v. Stewart:
They [injuries to the person] have always been considered beyond the
scope of the powers of a court of equity. In Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402,
Lord Eldon said: "The question will be whether the bill has stated facts of
which the court can take notice, as a case of civil property, which it is
bound to protect." In Bisp. Eq. 5th ed., p. 584, note 2, it is said: "But it is
103 Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949). Accord, B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 208 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Diggs v. State Board of
Embalmers and Funeral Directors, 321 Mich. 508, 32 N.W.2d 728 (1948).
104 Roadway Transit Co. v. Buffalo, 279 App. Div. 705, 108 N.Y.S.2d 425 (4th Dep't
1951); Schrager v. Albany, 197 Misc. 903, 99 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1950).
105 Malkin v. City of Chicago, 6 Il. App. 2d 151, 127 N.E.2d 145 (1955).
106 Burden v. Hoover, 7 Ill. App. 2d 296, 129 N.E.2d 463 (1955).
107 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
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the rights of property, or, rather, rights in property, that equity interferes
to protect. A party is not entitled to a writ of injunction for a matter
affecting his person." In Kerr, Inj., pp. 1, 2, it is said: "A court of equity is
conversant only with questions of property and the maintenance of civil
rights. Injury to property whether actual or prospective is the foundation
on which its jurisdiction rests .... ,)108
There are few statements regarding equity jurisdiction that have less
foundation in history, that have been more carefully analyzed and refuted,
and yet, until recently, slavishly accepted by the courts as controlling."°
From an historical standpoint, it is not unworthy of note that applica-
tions for protection from personal torts occupied much of the Chancellor's
attention in the formative stage of equity from the reign of Richard II to
that of Queen Elizabeth. In a review of A Calendar of the Proceedings
in Chancery in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; to which are prefixed
Examples of earlier Proceedings in that Court, viz. from the reign of
Richard 1H to that of Queen Elizabeth inclusive-From the Originals in
the Tower, Vol. I, 1827, we read:
From those proceedings it appears that the chief business of the Court of
Chancery in those early times did not arise from the uses of land, according
to the opinion of most writers on the subject; very few instances of applica-
tions to the Chancellor on such grounds occurring among the proceedings of
the Chancery, during the four or five first reigns after the equitable jurisdic-
tion of the Court seems to have been fully established. Most of these ancient
petitions appear to have been presented in consequence of assaults and
trespasses, and a variety of outrages which were cognizable at common law,
but for which the party complaining was unable to obtain redress, in con-
sequence of the maintenance or protection afforded to his adversary by some
powerful baron, or by the sheriff or other officer of the county in which they
occurred.1 lo
When equity became more established as a system and its procedure
more formal, a reluctance to entertain tort actions may have been due to
an appreciation that, since the equity court sat at Westminster and did
not go on circuit and since proof in equity was made by deposition and not
through the oral testimony of witnesses, a court of law was the more
efficient place to try a tort case. Dean Pound has emphasized that: "We
must remember that in 1818 [the date of the decision in Gee v. Pritchard]
the jurisdiction of equity to enjoin trespasses on land was not yet well devel-
oped and the whole subject of equity jurisdiction over torts was backward
108 82 Md. 323,325, 33 AUt. $42, 543 (1896).
109 Annot., 37 L.RA.. 783 (1897) ; Bennett, "Injunctive Protection of Personal Interests,"
1 La. L. Rev. 665 (1939); Long, "Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights," 33
Yale L.J. 115 (1923); Pound, "Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Per-
sonalty," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916); Note, "A Re-interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard," 25
Mich. L. Rev. 889 (1927).
110 1 The Jurist 327, 328 (1828).
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because of the unsatisfactory mode of trial." '' Today, when the mode
of trial is the same at law and in equity, there is not the same reason for
withholding equity jurisdiction, and the fact that cases of trespass to land
were turned out of equity as, late as the first half of the nineteenth century
is no longer permitted to cast doubt upon the fact that equity always had
a potential jurisdiction in this field.
With regard to the belief that the protection of personal rights is beyond
the scope of the powers of equity, it has been charged that:
... a declaration of this sort taken literally and in its full meaning would
make the system of equity suitable only to a semi-savage society which has
much respect for property but little for human life. Our equity jurispru-
dence does not deserve so severe a reproach. It does, indeed, do much for
the protection of personal rights, although it has not been willing to ac-
knowledge the fact but has persisted in declaring the contrary.1"
Doubtless Lord Eldon was conscious of this same belief. In 1818, it
would have been difficult to find that a publication by the receiver of
confidential and non-libelous letters constituted a personal tort. But Lord
Eldon held that the writer had a property right in such letters which
justified an injunction against the threatened unauthorized publication of
them and he said:
I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written in con-
fidence, or because the publication of them would wound the feelings of the
Plaintiff; but if mischievous effects of that kind can be apprehended in cases
in which this Court has been accustomed, on the ground of property, to forbid
publication, it would not become me to abandon the jurisdiction which my
predecessors have exercised, and refuse to forbid it.113
Because his decision was that there was a property right which he
would protect, any suggestion that he could not protect personal rights
was dictum.
Many other courts have sensed the backwardness of a system of equity
that lacked power to protect personal rights in appropriate instances. The
usual course has been to bow to the influence of previous pronouncements
of the false doctrine and then ingeniously find a property interest of some
sort sufficient to warrant the granting of relief. Professor Bennett, in an
interesting review of decisions, suggests that the existence or non-existence
of a property right has seldom been a controlling consideration in the
judicial process; that where the court thinks relief should not be granted:
* . . it is very convenient and legalistically convincing to state, "Relief
denied because no property interest is involved." On the other hand, where
relief is expedient the court may fashion the necessary property right, and
l1l Pound, supra note 109, at 643.
212 37 L.R.A. 783 (1897).
113 2 Swans. 402,36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
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the technical or unsubstantial nature of that right is apparently of little or
no importance." 4
The achievement of progress in the law by indirection is not uncommon,
but here, the method tends to perpetuate a false premise. The more forth-
right method of meeting the issue head-on would remove an error that has
persisted too long. It would be sounder, if relief is to be denied, to assign
the real reason, as, for example, that the law has not recognized the
claimed interest, that there is an adequate legal remedy or that to grant
relief would be impractical or futile,115 and, if the claim merits equity, to
grant relief whether the interest to be protected relates to the plaintiff's
person or his property.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts met the issue head-on
in Kenyon v. City of Chicopee,"6 where the plaintiff sought to enjoin
arrest for alleged violations of an unconstitutional ordinance, and said:
In reading the decisions holding or stating that equity will protect only
property rights, one is struck by the absence of any convincing reason for
such a sweeping generalization. We are by no means satisfied that property
rights and personal rights are always as distinct and readily separable as
much of the public discussion in recent years would have them. But in so
far as the distinction exists we cannot believe that personal rights recognized
by law are in general less important to the individual or less vital to society
or less worthy of protection by the peculiar remedies equity can afford than
are property rights. . . . We believe the true rule to be that equity will
protect personal rights by injunction upon the same conditions upon which
it will protect property rights by injunction. In general, these conditions are,
that unless relief is granted a substantial right of the plaintiff will be
impaired to a material degree; that the remedy at law is inadequate; and
that injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and without
imposing an impossible burden on the court or bringing its processes into
disrepute. A number of courts have tended toward this view. Legal writers
support it. There is no such body of authority opposed to it in this Com-
monwealth as to preclude its adoption here.
This position was adopted a year later by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, the court emphasizing that . . . "invasion of per-
sonal interests are accordingly less capable of translation into money
terms than invasions of property interests."" 7 The Supreme Court did
114 Bennett, supra note 109, at 668, 694.
115 Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 389, 165 N.E. 819, 822 (1929): "It is not the
province of courts of equity to administer paternal relief in domestic affairs. As a matter
of practical fact, such decrees cannot be enforced."
116 320 Mass. 528, 533, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1946). An exhaustive annotation on this point
will be found in 175 A.L.R. 438-523 (1948).
117 Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (restraining expulsion from a poli-
tical society). When the club was incorporated, mandamus rather than injunction was held to
be the proper remedy in Mitchell v. Jewish Progressive Club, 253 Ala. 195,43 So. 2d 529 (1949).
For exhaustive note on relief from expulsion from clubs, religious bodies, and professional
associations, see Note 20 A.L.R.2d 344-590 (1951).
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not question the propriety of injunctive relief in the school segregation
cases.:"" Other courts in protecting against racial discrimination, have
approved the use of the injunction, sometimes repudiating the notion that
equity protects only property rights,119 and sometimes without reference
to this dispute. 2 ' The error attributable to Lord Eldon's unfortunate
dictum is at last being authoritatively corrected and plaintiffs can now
expect with more confidence to obtain injunctive relief against threatened
irreparable injury to personal rights.
SUMMARY
This plea for a more general adoption of the equitable attitude and
equitable principles by courts sitting at law and for a more general exten-
sion of equitable remedies by courts sitting in equity might alternatively
have been entitled the "Progress of Equity." With one exception, the
adoption of the balance of interests doctrine by courts sitting at law, there
is not one of the suggestions or examples set forth here that has not been
found acceptable and given effect by the courts of one or more of our
American jurisdictions. Their decisions were not shockingly revolutionary
and not so unsupportable that they cannot be approved and followed.
They were rather the happy result of an understanding of the history of
our Anglo-American law and of an appreciation of the desirable conse-
quences of a transition from a period of competing courts of law and
equity to a new era in which we have a single court administering both
law and equity. This understanding and appreciation is all that is needed
for a more complete and perfect merger of law and equity and for the
further Progress of Equity."2
118 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
119 -Colbert v. Coney Island, Inc., 97 Ohio App. 311, 121 N.E.2d 911 (1954) (restraining
a denial of admission to defendant's amusement park. A demurrer was sustained because of
misjoinder of plaintiffs but without prejudice to the maintenance of separate actions).
120 Whitmore v. Stillwell, 227 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1955) (restraining denial of admission
to college because of race); Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955) (restraining discrimination at the public beaches) ; Detroit Housing Commission
v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th ' Cir. 1955); Simmons v. Skiner, 108 A.2d 173 (Del. Ch. 1954)
(enjoining cancellation of registration in high school) ; plaintiff's right was characterized as a
personal one but there was no further discussion of the distinction between personal and
property interests.
121 In a companion article, "A Brief on Behalf of a Course in Equity," which will appear
in The Journal of Legal Education, it is urged that unless law schools continue to teach a
general course in Equity, the desired further progress in the real, as distinguished from the
formal merger of law and equity may, in time, be halted. Some of the examples used in
this article are sketched more briefly there in support of that thesis.
